T HE idea that "it takes a Nixon to go to China"-that hawkish actors' national security credibility gives them political advantages in pursuing dovish policies-has been the source of lively debate in the scholarly literature.
ratification in Congress. We identify two features of the political setting that can mitigate this challenge. First, although the president has better information than most legislators, defense specialists within Congress can alleviate the credibility problem by endorsing a deal. Second, the president can gain the support of key endorsers by offering them side payments on other issues. As a result, dovish presidents can overcome their credibility gap by paying a "ratification premium," usually in the form of increased defense efforts in areas not covered by the treaty. The doves' disadvantage therefore manifests itself not in an inability to get dovish deals ratified, but rather in the higher premium required to obtain support. In other words, had Hubert Humphrey rather than Richard Nixon been elected in 1968, he could have gone to China, but his ticket would have been more expensive.
After developing this logic through a formal model, we compare the politics of ratification surrounding two pairs of treaties: first, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (salt) treaties signed by Nixon and Jimmy Carter and, second, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (sort) signed by George W. Bush and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New start) signed by Barack Obama. In both pairs of cases, the Republican president had no trouble securing ratification, whereas the Democratic president had to offer substantial side payments to key endorsers. In salt ii, Carter came close to a deal for ratification in return for greater defense spending before a series of crises altered perceptions of the Soviet Union and thus perceptions of the safety of an arms treaty, which pushed the ratification premium too high. 3 In the case of New start, Obama won ratification by agreeing to a major nuclear modernization.
This article makes several contributions. First, it mediates the Nixonto-China debate in a way that accounts for both its core logic and the political agency of doves. 4 It thus contributes to a new wave of scholarship on domestic politics and international relations that emphasizes how even democratic leaders can bypass constraints, for example, by cutting deals with other elites or shaping policy in a manner that diminishes voter accountability. 5 We offer a new twist by showing that dovish presidents can use such strategies to escape being captives of their type. We do so by integrating both formal theory and historical case 6 Goemans and Spaniel 2016, 25. 7 On side payments in two-level games, see Putnam 1988, 450-51; and Milner 1997, 109-12. For research that addresses side payments in the context of security, see Mayer 1992; Saunders 2015; Saunders 2018; and Saunders and Wolford 2018. 8 Krehbiel 1992; Milner 1997, 86-95. 9 Partial exceptions include Saunders 2015; and Saunders 2018. 10 Some arms control advocates have noted that their expected allies on the Democratic side have not reduced the arsenal as much as their Republican counterparts. See, e.g., Kristensen 2014. 11 For an overview, see Sagan 2014. 12 Exceptions include Lebovic 2013; Vaynman 2014; Cameron 2018; Kreps 2018b. studies-"well suited companions in research" that are nonetheless infrequently coupled. 6 Second, we advance understandings of how and when leaders can deploy side payments to achieve policy goals, a process that has been explored more frequently in matters of trade than for security issues. 7 We show that side payments offer a way for dovish leaders to overcome their credibility problems on arms control by buying the support of informed endorsers, who can then signal to their colleagues that a deal is safe. Although specialists are central to informational theories of Congress-and Helen Milner explicitly models their role in the ratification process 8 -most prior work has neither considered side payments to influence experts' signals nor identified partisan asymmetries that can arise. 9 Third, our argument helps to explain important features of the arms control record. Whether Republicans or Democrats have reduced arsenal size or ratified agreements at higher rates tells only a partial story, 10 obscuring the domestic negotiations that have significant implications for the shape of the American nuclear arsenal and overall defense effort. For doves, cuts in arms covered by a treaty are partly offset by increases in areas not covered by it, suggesting that the overall change in military effort may be less than the headline numbers imply.
the domestic politics of arms control
Our theory explores the different domestic constraints on hawks and doves in the context of arms control. The recent renaissance in nuclear studies has led to a renewed focus on the domestic politics of states' nuclear decision-making. 11 But much of the analytical effort has focused on the politics of proliferation to new states (horizontal proliferation), with little exploration of arms control (vertical proliferation) . 12 Yet arms control affects the weapons available to states making nuclear policy at the international level. In the United States, the interaction between the president and Congress over the ratification of an arms control treaty affects the kinds of deals that can be concluded and their implications for overall defense effort.
The core political dynamic in our theory captures two features of arms control debates. First, politicians have different priorities and preferences regarding arms control. Relatively hawkish politicians are willing to forgo more domestic consumption to achieve better outcomes vis-à-vis foreign adversaries, while doves generally prioritize domestic effort. In the US context, the hawk/dove distinction relates closely to partisanship. Although there are notable Democrats with hawkish views, Democrats have historically been more supportive of arms control than Republicans (as Table 1 , below, demonstrates). 13 Party may also matter independent of ideology because politicians have partisan incentives to support or oppose a president's initiative.
14 Opposition to a deal can thus arise from genuine principle and/or from political gamesmanship. Indeed, our model implies that hawkishness and partisan bias are substitutes and may be indistinguishable.
Second, information asymmetries-between the president and both the public and most members of Congress-are likely to be severe in the arms control context, given the technical and military-strategic complexity of weapons systems and verification methods. However, some members of Congress are specialists who have an information advantage over their colleagues, either because of their defense expertise or because they serve on congressional armed services or foreign relations committees.
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Our model therefore distinguishes between two kinds of legislators. One is the pivotal legislator whose vote is needed to ratify a treaty. In the United States, a formal treaty requires approval from two-thirds of the Senate, and even international agreements that do not undergo formal ratification may still need legislative majorities to implement their terms. 16 The other is a potential endorser, a legislator who has information about the desirability of the treaty. This legislator's endorsement or lack thereof is likely to influence other members of Congress, giving the endorser leverage to extract concessions from the president. Critical endorsers may be members of either the leader's own party or the 13 Scholars have observed partisan asymmetries across a range of policy issues, including peace overtures, defense budgets, war finance, and crisis bargaining. See, inter alia, Fordham 1998; FloresMacias and Kreps 2013; Schultz 2005; Mattes and Weeks forthcoming. 14 See, e.g., Howell and Pevehouse 2007. 15 E.g., Krehbiel 1992 . 16 Putnam 1988, 436. opposition party, but one common feature is that they tend to be more hawkish than their colleagues.
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In focusing on the interaction between the president and Congress, our theory holds aside other potentially important players, including voters. In the context of arms control, data suggest that although voters may be aware of ongoing negotiations, they do not typically focus on the details, nor do they see the issue as especially salient. Just before the ratification vote for the New start treaty, for example, a Pew survey in December 2010 found that a majority of Americans were supportive of the treaty, but 83 percent reported hearing either "a little" (52 percent) or "nothing at all" (31 percent) about it.
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A more consequential actor not explicitly in the model is the military, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff (jcs). Most presidents contend with the challenge of keeping an often-skeptical jcs on board with arms control, in part because of the signal the jcs could send to senators. 19 At the same time, jcs appointments are political, and the president can often put like-minded people in these positions. 20 Thus, while the backing of the Joint Chiefs is necessary for ratification, it is not always sufficient. We focus on the price that presidents have to pay for ratification beyond that paid to the jcs. a model of treaty ratification and side payments This section presents a formal, game-theoretic model incorporating the key assumptions made above, focusing on the core results. The supplementary material includes a detailed treatment of the solution. 21 The presentation proceeds in two steps. First, we consider a game without side payments and show conditions under which dovish presidents may face difficulty getting arms control deals ratified. We then amend the game to include the possibility of a transfer from the president to an informed endorser. If that endorser is sufficiently hawkish, the endorsement is a credible signal to the rest of the legislature, even if other senators know it has been purchased through a side payment. 17 The literature has found mixed results on whether committee members tend to be preference outliers; see, e.g., Krehbiel 1990 . However, even studies that reject this hypothesis have found that members of the Armed Services Committee in both chambers are significantly more hawkish than their colleagues; see Ray 1980. 18 Kohut 2010 , 7. 19 Miller 1984 . 20 Golby 2011. 21 Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz 2018b. actors and preferences The model assumes two states, domestic (D) and foreign (F ). Within D, we focus on three actors: the president (P ), the pivotal legislator (L), and an endorser (E). P negotiates and signs treaties, which are subject to ratification by L. E is a member of the legislature who specializes in foreign affairs and has access to the same information as P about the nature of the adversary. Arms control negotiations influence the level of military effort each state expends. Let m i ∈ [0,1] where i ∈ {D,F} denote the share of each state's resources devoted to the military. Military effort is costly because it diverts resources from consumption, but the states' relative military effort influences the distribution of some international good. In particular, assume that for each actor i in D, the utility from a given level of military effort, m D , given the foreign state's effort, is
The first part of this expression captures the loss of consumption due to military effort, while the second uses a standard contest function to map relative military effort into a share of the international good enjoyed by D. Variation of g i across actors captures differences in how much each actor values the international good relative to consumption. Higher values of g i correspond to more hawkish actors. For any given level of foreign military effort, each actor in D has single-peaked preferences over m D and an ideal spending level that is increasing in hawkishness, g i . Let m i SQ denote the status quo levels of military effort-levels that reflect the history of prior decisions and investments. An arms control treaty is a deal in which both states agree to reduce their military effort to some specified levels, m i T < m i SQ . In principle, for any initial levels of military investment, there are many potential agreements that make both sides better off; for example, any deal that preserves the status quo balance of power at lower levels of effort is Pareto improving. Crucially, any such deal has to withstand temptations to exploit the restraint of the other side. As James Fearon shows, the danger that either side could renege and use its military advantage to extract concessions or wage war puts a lower bound on how far states can safely cut.
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To focus on the politics of ratification, we simplify international con- 22 Fearon 2018. siderations by assuming that there are two states of the world-"good" and "bad"-that differ in how safe it is for D to cut military effort as part of a deal. In principle, a variety of factors determine the state of the world, including the adversary's preferences (g F ), its general trustworthiness, the effectiveness of monitoring and verification mechanisms, and so on. D has to be concerned not only with whether F will enact agreed-upon cuts, but also with how it will behave in their aftermath. We assume that in the good state of the world, F can be expected to comply with the terms of a deal, and in the bad state of the world, it is expected to renege. In the model, reneging implies retaining status quo military effort. However, none of the substantive results depend on that specific assumption, and one could interpret reneging more broadly to include any subsequent actions that render the agreed-upon level of cuts unsafe.
Though crude, this assumption creates some desirable properties. For each actor in D, beliefs about the adversary's compliance determine both the ideal level of cuts and the maximum level of cuts that are deemed tolerable. Let k i = m i SQ -m i T denote the level of cuts by each state in a potential treaty. For each state of the world, s ∈{G,B}, and for a given level of cuts by the foreign state, k F , the preferences of each actor i in D can be characterized by (1) the optimal level of cuts that it would like to make, k i * (k F ,s), and (2) the maximum level of cuts that it is willing to make for the treaty to be preferable to the status quo, k -i (k F ,s). Both of these terms are decreasing in g i , so more hawkish actors want and are willing to accept fewer cuts. Both terms are also higher in the good state of the world than in the bad; more optimistic beliefs about the adversary induce a preference for higher cuts and raise the upper level of cuts that are deemed tolerable.
sequence of moves
The sequence of moves is as follows. First, nature determines whether the state of the world is good or bad. Nature's draw is revealed to P and E, but not to L. P then decides on a treaty to propose to the foreign state. We assume for simplicity that F 's concession is fixed. For example, the deal will eliminate or reduce some class of weapons from F's arsenal, implying a cut in military effort,
. The president then decides the level of cuts to offer in return, denoted by
The foreign state then accepts or rejects the proposed treaty. For simplicity, and to focus on the politics of domestic ratification, we do not treat F as a strategic actor but instead assume that there is some minimum level of cuts by D, k D , such that F will only agree to a deal if k D ≥ k D . We revisit the implications of this assumption below. If P and F agree to a treaty, it goes to D's legislature for ratification. E first decides whether to endorse the deal, and then, after observing E 's decision, L decides whether to ratify the agreement.
If the deal is ratified, D implements the specified level of cuts, while F implements its side of the deal if and only if the state of the world is good. If the deal is not ratified, then the status quo levels of military effort are retained. Players then receive payoffs from the enacted levels according to equation 1. In addition, we assume that decisions to ratify a treaty may have political implications for the president and the president's party. Assume that P pays some cost, c, for proposing a treaty that is rebuffed. L and/or E may be from a different party than the president, in which case they derive a partisan benefit, π, for denying the president a victory.
information and Beliefs
The key source of uncertainty in the model revolves around whether the adversary can be trusted-assumed in the model to be the likelihood that it will carry out its end of the deal-which depends on the state of the world. We assume that the better informed P and E know the true state of the world, while L has a prior belief that the state of the world is good with probability q. As a shorthand, it is useful to refer to a president who knows the state of the world to be good (bad) as a "good world" ("bad world") president. Note that this language does not imply anything about the quality of the president. preliminary oBservations and assumptions Although actors' preferences are indexed by g i , it helps to characterize the different types according to the level of cuts in military effort they are willing to make. To simplify notation, let
denote actor i 's ideal and maximum acceptable level of cuts, respectively, in the good state of the world. Both terms decrease monotonically in g i . Because E and L may derive a political benefit, π, from rejecting a treaty, their maximum level of acceptable cuts is also decreasing in this partisan bias parameter. Note that no deal is acceptable at both the international and the domestic levels if the deepest level of cuts L would ever agree to, k -L , is less than the minimum level 23 Lebo and O'Geen 2011. required by the foreign state, k D . Thus, we restrict attention to cases in which a deal is possible, or k -
Crucial to the dynamic of interest is that sufficiently dovish actors prefer to cut military effort even in the status quo. For doves, arms control provides cover for reducing defense effort regardless of whether the foreign state will reciprocate. As a result, such an actor would be willing to sign a treaty even knowing the foreign state would not enact its side of the bargain. The possibility that a dovish P would propose cuts in the bad state of the world, combined with P 's superior knowledge about the state of the world, creates the credibility problem at the heart of the model. Define k -
as the maximum level of cuts that P would like to make in the status quo. This term decreases as the president's hawkishness increases and is greater than zero only for low (that is, dovish) values of g P . The credibility problem emerges when the president is so dovish that k -
, in which case there is a danger that the bad world president would be willing to sign on to the level of cuts that the good world president wants to propose and/or the legislature would be willing to ratify. For ease of exposition, we assume this problem kicks in only when the president is dovish relative to the pivotal legislator, that is, when
Finally, we assume that neither E nor L is so dovish that they would tolerate arms cuts in the bad state of the world. For L, this assumption makes sense because if the pivotal legislator preferred to cut military effort unilaterally in the status quo, then international negotiations would be unnecessary. For E, we need only assume that an informed specialist exists for which this condition holds. Given evidence about the relative hawkishness of members of the armed services committees, as well as what we know about specific endorsers in our case studies, this assumption seems reasonable 24 and helps to ensure that, in equilibrium, E only endorses deals in the good state of the world.
solution to the Game without side payments Holding the preferences of F, E, and L constant, the equilibrium strategies can take five forms, depending on the hawkishness of the president. In every case, E endorses the deal if and only if the state of the world is good and the level of cuts proposed is less than or equal to the maximum level of cuts that E prefers to the status quo, or k D ≤ k - a result, E 's endorsement unambiguously signals that the cuts are safe, and L will vote to ratify as long as the level of cuts is within its accept-
L may also vote to ratify a deal that E does not endorse, as long as the posterior probability that conditions are good is high enough. The president's equilibrium proposal and whether a treaty is signed and/or ratified depend on the president's hawkishness, as follows:
In this case, no treaty is possible because the maximum level of cuts that the president is willing to make in the good state of the world is less than the minimum level of cuts required by the foreign state.
A moderate hawk is willing to make the minimum level of cuts needed to get the foreign state's approval if the state of the world is good. Thus, the good world president can propose a treaty at k D = k D . Since the bad world president would not want to make those cuts (
, there is no credibility problem: L can infer that state of the world from P 's willingness to agree to cuts. As a result, E's signal is irrelevant, and L will ratify this proposal.
This case is similar to the preceding one, but the president wants to make deeper cuts than are necessary to get the foreign state's approval. Because the bad world president would not want to make such cuts
, there is again no credibility problem, and L will ratify such a deal.
In this case, the good world president's ideal level of cuts is deeper than the legislature will ratify, so the best deal this president can get is the most dovish treaty that can be ratified,
Since the bad world president would not want to propose such a deal (k -
, there is again no credibility problem, the signal of the endorser is irrelevant, and L will ratify this deal.
The most complicated case arises if the president would be willing to make the deepest level of cuts the legislature would approve, k -L , even if the state of the world were bad. In this case, L has to worry that a
is coming from a bad world president and would lead to unsafe cuts. Under these conditions, the signal of the endorser becomes important, and a variety of outcomes might obtain in equilibrium.
The most straightforward case occurs when the endorser is somewhat more dovish than the pivotal legislator and/or has a lower partisan bias, so that k -
. E prefers a treaty to the status quo if and only if
and the state of the world is good. This means that E will endorse the most dovish deal the L will ratify,
, but only if conditions warrant. Since E 's endorsement fully resolves the uncertainty, L will ratify the agreement if and only if it is endorsed. Thus, under these conditions, the endorser has both the incentive and the ability to resolve the dovish P 's credibility problem.
The more interesting case arises when the endorser is more hawkish and/or has higher partisan bias than the pivotal legislator, so that
This configuration is particularly relevant, given that legislators who specialize in defense policy-and thus are good candidates to serve as E-tend to be more hawkish than their colleagues. In this case, L is willing to ratify some deals that E would like to see defeated and hence will not endorse. As a result, L may be uncertain whether to ratify a proposal or not.
Under this configuration of preferences, there exist a variety of possible equilibria that are fully characterized in the supplementary material. 25 The model cannot say which equilibrium will be played, and while a refinement might eliminate some, the range of possible equilibria is itself instructive. Across these equilibria, the president faces a trade-off between the level of cuts and the likelihood of ratification. There is an equilibrium in which P proposes a modest level of cuts that is acceptable to the hawkish endorser (k D = k -E ) and will be ratified for certain. Alternatively, there are equilibria in which P proposes deeper cuts (k -
, but these treaties are not endorsed, and L rejects them with nonzero probability. The trade-off becomes more severe for more dovish presidents, for whom the probability of ratification decreases as the depth of proposed cuts increases.
The logic of this case illustrates that absent the option of side payments, P is a captive of type. When a moderately dovish P proposes 25 Specifically, two types of equilibria exist when P is a dove and k -
One is a separating equilibrium in which the good world P proposes k D = k -E , the bad world P signs no treaty, E endorses the treaty, and L ratifies it. There also exists a continuum of semiseparating equilibria in which the good
, the bad world P mixes between this deal and none, E refuses to endorse, and L ratifies with some probability less than one. These equilibria only exist for values of k D such that the good world P prefers this risky proposal to the sure thing at
The formal proofs are found in Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz 2018b .
, L knows the state of the world is good and is willing to ratify this deal. However, if the dovish P proposes the same deal and the hawkish E withholds its endorsement, L cannot ratify with certainty. If L were to ratify, the dovish president would have incentives to offer the same deal even in the bad state of the world. Thus, in order to deter a dovish P from proposing this deal under unsafe conditions, L has to reject it with nonzero probability. In other words, because L cannot trust that the dovish president will propose an acceptable deal only when conditions warrant, L must sometimes reject that deal. To ensure ratification, P has to propose more modest cuts that will receive E's endorsement. Figure 1 summarizes the equilibrium proposal(s) of the good world president as a function of the president's dovishness. This figure focuses on the case in which E is more hawkish than L (k -
)-the conditions under which the credibility problem is most severe. The shaded area shows the range of possible proposals that may be made by the dovish president. All proposals along the solid line are ratified for certain, while proposals in the shaded area have a nonzero risk of rejection.
side payments: BarGaininG with the endorser We have seen that there are conditions under which a dovish president may have difficulty getting a deal ratified-namely, if L fears that P is using the arms control treaty to enact cuts that are unsafe and if the proposed cuts are so deep that the informed endorser is unwilling to reassure colleagues. Although such a president can always ensure ratification by proposing the level of cuts acceptable to the endorser, k D = k -E , the dove's preference for deeper cuts creates an opportunity for E to extract concessions.
Why negotiate with E rather than the pivotal legislator? First, given the demands on legislators' time and attention, it makes sense for L to delegate to an expert and rely on E's cue. L can also generally get a better deal this way. The president's incentive is to get L to agree to the maximum level of cuts L can tolerate. But if the president has to placate an endorser who is more hawkish, the outcome will likely be closer to L's ideal point. Negotiating with E can also benefit the president. For a good world president to placate L, the president's offer would not only have to be large enough to buy L's support, but would also have to be large enough that a bad world president would be unwilling to mimic it. To buy off E, the good world president needs only to make an offer large enough that E will prefer it to the status quo when conditions are good. Because E knows the state of the world, the good world president does not have to outbid the bad world president for E 's support.
Crucially, that E is fully informed also means that E 's endorsement of the deal conveys information even if it was known to have been purchased with a side payment. The reason is that E requires a larger concession from a bad world president than from a good world one. Therefore, L can infer the state of the world from the size of the side payment that E demands in return for an endorsement.
Formally, we amend the game so that the president's proposal can include a side payment that E values. We keep the nature of the side payment unspecified and simply treat it as something that benefits E and comes at a cost to P. The side payment may also benefit other legislators. Although the solution in the supplementary material 26 assumes that L does not benefit from the transfer, the main intuition does not depend on this. 27 We assume that L observes the side payment, an fiGure 1 equiliBrium proposals as a function of president's type a a This figure summarizes the equilibrium proposals made by the good world president as a function of the president's dovishness. For the dovish P, the shaded area shows the range of possible proposals when E is more hawkish than L. Without side payments, all proposals along the solid line are ratified for certain, while proposals in the shaded area have a nonzero risk of being rejected. The proposals along the dashed line illustrate possible cuts that are ratified for certain if the president makes side payments to the endorser.
Level of Cuts Proposed in Treaty
important assumption for the logic that is also borne out in the cases.
Once the president offers a package, the game proceeds as before: E decides whether to endorse the deal, and L votes to ratify or not. We assume either that the arms control treaty and the side payment are both enacted or that neither is. Focusing on the case of a dovish
, the main challenge for the good world P is to compensate E for endorsing a deal that cuts more deeply than E would like. Additionally, E may be motivated by partisan bias to deny the president a foreign policy victory (π > 0). Thus, for a given proposal of cuts
there is some minimum level of transfers that the good world president needs to make to win the endorser's support. This minimum transfer increases with the proposed cuts. In equilibrium, the good world president proposes an optimal package of cuts and transfers that compensates E just enough to win E 's endorsement. In principle, a bad world president could also attempt to buy off E, but for any given level of proposed cuts, the transfers needed are higher. Thus, L will ratify a deal only if E endorsed it for the right (that is, the lower) price. As shown in the supplementary material, the optimal level of cuts increases as the P becomes more dovish, as does the amount of the transfer needed to ensure ratification. 28 Returning to Figure 1 , the dashed line illustrates proposals that could win endorsement and ratification in exchange for a side payment.
That said, there is no guarantee that a dovish president is better off making a transfer than not. Even though transfers can ensure ratification, they come at a cost that P might not want to pay. Under some conditions, withholding the payment and risking ratification failure is the better bet. Thus, we would expect to see side payments only when they promise the president a net benefit. discussion Several implications follow for both arms control ratification and domestic political bargaining. First, all else equal, dovish presidents have a harder time than hawks getting deals ratified. That doves want to cut military effort even in the absence of a treaty creates a credibility problem: the pivotal legislator worries that such a president would sign a deal even when the foreign state will not carry out its obligations or harbors aggressive preferences. Under these conditions, the legislature will ratify a deal for certain only if there is some signal from an informed actor that international conditions warrant doing so. The endorser at least partially resolves the problem posed by the information asymmetry, reducing the danger that good deals (from L's perspective) will be mistakenly rejected or bad deals mistakenly accepted. Nevertheless, even with the endorser, there is still a danger of both mistakes under some conditions.
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This leads to the second implication: the desire of dovish presidents for an agreement gives bargaining power to legislative specialists who can credibly endorse the deal. When the informed endorser is more hawkish than the pivotal legislator, the endorser can extract concessions in exchange for the endorsement. Once side payments are introduced, they eliminate the risk of mistakes due to uncertainty, at least when they are used. Thus, even if L does not directly benefit from the transfers, they make the pivotal legislator better off.
The model is silent with respect to the nature of these transfers, but we can imagine two possibilities. One is a targeted benefit or a concession on some unrelated issue. But since the endorser needs to credibly argue that the package is safe from a national security perspective, being bought off by concessions unrelated to defense is both unseemly and likely to undermine that argument. Alternatively, E could demand increased military effort in an area not covered by the treaty so that the net cut to military effort is no more than k -E . Since arms control agreements regulate a specific activity (for example, testing) or weapon system, states are generally free to increase other military effort. We sidestep the question of why arms control agreements have limited agendas and take as given that states tolerate some increases in other military effort. The model shows that a dovish president's ratification premium magnifies any such effect.
The model also speaks to the effect of increasing political polarization in the American political system. 30 Polarization affects two parameters: first, the distance in hawkishness between a Democratic president and the pivotal member of the Senate and, second, the partisan bias parameter, π. Interestingly, partisan bias and hawkishness are substitutes: for each actor with hawkishness g and partisan bias π, there is an actor with hawkishness g ′ > g and no partisan bias whose preferences and behavior are identical. Thus, hawkishness and partisan bias are empirically difficult to distinguish. What is clear is that increasing polarization worsens the prospects for arms control, particularly for Democratic 29 In particular, in the semiseparating equilibria that hold when P is a dove and E is relatively hawkish, bad deals are accepted and good deals are rejected with nonzero probability. 30 In the context of arms control, see Lee 2017; more broadly, see Schultz 2017. presidents. We can see this by holding the president's hawkishness, g P , constant and increasing either g L or π. Referring to Figure 1 , the cut points k -E and k -L , as well as the unlabeled cut point separating moderate doves from doves, all move lower with those changes. Thus, polarization leads to (1) a larger range of presidents who are moderate doves and thus constrained by L's preferences, (2) a larger range of presidents who are effectively doves and thus face the credibility problem identified here, (3) larger minimum side payments to ensure that a proposal from a dovish P is endorsed, and (4) lower levels of cuts that can be achieved. As a result, Democratic presidents will encounter higher ratification premiums, which they may choose not to pay, and they will have incentives to craft deals in a way that avoids ratification requirements, such as by resorting to executive agreements.
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Before moving to the empirical analysis, it is worth recalling that the model assumes that F is not strategic and that its concession is fixed. This simplification raises two main concerns. The first is that the model ignores the role of the ratification constraint on international bargaining. The well-known Schelling conjecture suggests that a dovish president could use the relative hawkishness of L and E to extract a more favorable deal from F. 32 In that situation, P might win E 's endorsement via a larger concession at the international level rather than through side payments at the domestic level. Indeed, presidents sometimes bring crucial members of Congress or their allies into the negotiating process in hopes of addressing their demands ex ante. But E cannot credibly commit not to extract additional concessions from the president after the deal is signed but before it is ratified. Thus, ex post negotiations between P and E still occur.
A second concern is that the model does not permit the foreign state to anticipate the side payments needed to ensure ratification and back out of the deal if those payments then render its own cuts unsafe. If the adversary were able to insist on some upper bound on military activities not covered by the treaty, then the strategy of using side payments could be foreclosed in some cases. Interestingly, the Soviet Union/Russia does not seem to have objected to defense spending increases that Presidents Carter and Obama offered during ratification debates over salt ii and New start, consistent with the understanding that arms control will spur efforts in other areas and that these agreements are useful as much for national security planning as for arms reductions. 
empirical analysis
Our theory predicts that Democrats can overcome ratification obstacles through side payments that secure key endorsements, whereas Republicans will face comparatively few obstacles and thus make fewer concessions. Table 1 shows the fate of all major arms control treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia since 1945, and includes the party of the president at signing as well as the ratification outcome. Republican presidents tend both to sign more agreements and to enjoy larger ratification majorities. Nevertheless, Democrats have also had successes, and the rate of ratification is not significantly different.
While these broad patterns are suggestive, they tell us little about the underlying politics. Tracing the bargaining in case studies illustrates the partisan asymmetries. Our strategy is to select two pairs of agreements with one Democratic and one Republican president in each pair. Although it is impossible to control perfectly for agreement terms and international conditions, the treaties in each pair involved cuts to the strategic nuclear arsenal and occurred in similar international environments. Both salt i and salt ii are Cold War agreements; sort and New start date from the post-Cold War (and post-9/11) era. To set the stage, Figure 2 illustrates the positions of the main players in our four cases. Because there is no systematic way to place US policymakers along a dove-hawk continuum, we proxy those positions using their left-right ideological position, estimated using dw-nominate.
34
The x-axis displays the positions of P, L, and E, with more dovish actors on the left and more hawkish ones on the right. As expected, the Republican presidents are more hawkish than the pivotal senator, and the Democratic presidents are more dovish. As we will see, the latter's more challenging path to ratification led them to seek out more hawkish endorsers, who are identified in the figure. 34 Poole and Rosenthal 2007. 35 The United States retained a qualitative advantage (especially given its multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, or mirv, capability), but the Soviets had a quantitative advantage that would persist after the agreements-a politically salient point for critics.
The political climate held pitfalls for President Nixon, who wanted an overwhelming vote not only to win ratification, but also to be seen as an adroit statesman. 36 The problems for Nixon were that Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress-the Senate had a 55-45 Democratic majority-and the unpopularity of the Vietnam War had led to funding clashes with Congress. In spite of these concerns, by January 1972, the administration was receiving signals that opposition would not be more than twenty votes in the Senate. 37 And, indeed, ultimately the Senate ratified the aBm Treaty by an 88-2 vote. Nixon submitted the Interim Agreement as an executive agreement to both chambers, where it passed 88-2 in the Senate and 329-7 in the House.
Nixon's path to ratification required substantial bargaining to achieve those resounding votes.
38 Part of this effort was directed at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose support is generally necessary, even for a Republican. When Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and the Joint Chiefs raised a last-minute demand for force modernization, the administration agreed to investments in the new Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber, as well as to other increases in the defense budget. 39 But given Nixon's worldview, these were hardly painful payments. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger later said that these were steps they were 35 For overviews, see Newhouse 1989; Goodby 2006, chap. 5; and Lebovic 2013, chap. 3. 36 See Gavin 2012, 108-12. 37 Backchannel Message from the Chief of the Delegation to SALT (Smith) to Kissinger, "Report on Briefing Senator Cooper, Tuesday, January 4," January 5, 1972, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969 -1976 , XXXII, SALT I, 1969 . At https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments /frus1969-76v32/d222, accessed 38 Platt 1991 , 247. 39 Platt 1991 "determined to do anyway." 40 Indeed, Nixon had requested additional funds for Trident for the 1973 budget before the salt i agreements were concluded. 41 Having satisfied the jcs, the administration moved to secure the most hawkish senators. Just prior to the Moscow summit, Kissinger met with Henry "Scoop" Jackson (D-Wash.) and John Stennis (D-Miss.), among others, to "do a little missionary work" on the hawkish flank. 42 Before he embarked on the trip, Nixon called Kissinger to say that the administration's "priority assignment between now and the time we get back is to talk to the hawks." 43 The next day, Nixon asked Kissinger's deputy, Alexander Haig, to "pick off individual Senators and very important opinion makers who are on the right to try to mute their criticism. . . . The most important point to make is that the President is not being taken in and that the military totally supports what we are doing." 44 But it was Jackson, who had also been a crucial endorser of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, who emerged as the voice of the hawks (for both parties). Haig noted in a message to Kissinger during the summit, "[T]he President will have some real difficulties with the right wing of the Republican Party. But in a pragmatic sense, they have nowhere else to go." 45 Thus, after the summit, the White House focused on Jackson, backing his amendment calling for equality in any subsequent salt ii agreement. 46 This amendment proved to be important for salt ii, but more remarkable was that Jackson accepted Nixon's promise to fix the agreement later. Additionally, shortly after the salt i ratifications, the administration embarked on a "purge" of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency partly to placate hawks, but, again, this was a move that accorded with the administration's inclinations. 47 Steven Miller notes that "salt i showed that ratification can be easy." 48 The agreement reflected the administration's preferences as well as those of the jcs: for example, the administration did not pursue a ban on mirvs in part because the jcs would not support it. 49 Trust and verification concerns, while not completely absent, were not widespread.
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Nixon did not face significant concern that the state of the world was bad, in part because his actions-including the opening to China earlier in 1972 and his visit to Moscow for the May summit-helped usher in a period of détente. The political advantages enjoyed by a Republican president meant that Nixon did not need to pay a significant ratification premium.
carter and salt ii By contrast, salt ii encountered strong headwinds. The conventional wisdom is that salt ii was doomed, if not from the outset, then by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
51 Less appreciated is how close President Carter came to getting the treaty ratified through bargaining with key senators, particularly Sam Nunn (D-Ga.). Carter managed this near success despite jettisoning a nearly completed salt ii agreement he had inherited from the Nixon and Ford administrations, while also facing much greater concern about whether the Soviets would uphold an agreement.
52 Uncertainty about whether the state of the world was safe enough to make the deep nuclear cuts Carter wanted increased over the course of the ratification debate because of external events like the Soviet brigade incident in Cuba, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the invasion of Afghanistan. Ultimately, these events cemented the view that the Soviets could not be trusted, and Carter could no longer buy support for salt ii. But before Afghanistan, Carter was nearly able to convince a hawkish endorser to signal the treaty's safety, demonstrating that a ratification premium can bring treaty approval within a dove's reach.
There is little doubt that Carter was perceived as a dove. His inaugural address promised that "we will move this year a step toward our ultimate goal-the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth."
53 Days into his administration, Carter asked Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to study the feasibility of making a deep cut in 48 Miller 1984, 84. 49 See Smith 1985, chap. 4; Miller 1984, 69. 50 Lebovic 2013, 82-83, 89. 51 See, e.g., Lebovic 2013, 124. 52 That Ford left this nearly completed agreement to Carter helps counter the argument that a salt ii would face headwinds after salt i regardless of the president. 53 Quoted in Lebovic 2013, 113. nuclear weapons. 54 One of Carter's initial decisions involved reducing defense spending and delaying a decision to produce the B-1 bomber.
55
Although he still envisioned targets that would increase the defense budget, 56 his ultimate decision to cancel the B-1 bomber was, in the words of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, "politically costly," because it was taken as "evidence that the president was 'soft' on defense and was practicing 'unilateral' arms control." 57 Other developments reinforced the perception that Carter was too dovish, including the Panama Canal treaty that returned the canal to Panama.
58 Thus, when in June 1979 the US and the USSR signed a salt ii agreement that was broader than salt i, particularly in terms of qualitative limits, opponents argued that salt ii would exacerbate the imbalances already created by Carter's early decisions to cancel or postpone defense programs.
59
As a result, Carter faced a political challenge that was different from Nixon's. Although his party controlled a majority in the Senate, Carter faced not only Republican hawks with both substantive and partisan reasons to oppose him, but also hawkish Democrats. Assessing the foreign policy outlook and salt ii prospects two days after the 1978 midterms, the National Security Council's congressional relations officer, Madeleine Albright, noted, " [W] e not only have to retain the votes we have, but also we must convert 20 out of the 24 undecideds-no easy task, if you look at the list." 60 Like Nixon, Carter sought to win over both the jcs and hawkish senators. The former proved relatively easy, and Carter's concessions brought them on board by the time of the treaty's congressional hearings. 61 As an anonymous Pentagon official wrote, the jcs used "the salt ii issue as a tacit lever in strengthening US defense posture. There is no doubt that their support of salt ii has been obtained as part of a silent bargaining process with the Administration." 62 But jcs support was not sufficient. 54 Garthoff 1994, 884-85 . 55 Goodby 2006, 115. 56 Goodby 2006, 114. 57 Quoted in Goodby 2006, 115. 58 Glad 2009, chap. 9. 59 For overviews of salt ii's domestic politics, see Caldwell 1991; Lebovic 2013, 89-115; and Glad 2009, chap. 10 ; on the treaty negotiations, see Talbott 1979. 60 Albright to Brzezinski, "Congressional Elections and Foreign Policy Outlook," November 9, 1978, Office of the National Security Advisor, Subject File, Box 14, Folder 6, Jimmy Carter Library [ JCL], 3 (all cited archival documents from the Carter Library can be found in Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz 2018a) .
61 Mini 2010, 309-59 . 62 Galen 1979, 3 . On the administration's courting of the jcs, even during the negotiations, for its endorsement in the ratification debate, see also Brzezinski to Carter, "Meeting with the JCS on SALT and Strategic Force Modernization," November 16, 1978, NLC-7-53-6-4-6, JCL; and Brzezinski to Carter, "JCS Views on SALT," October 25, 1978, NLC-7-53-6-4-6, JCL.
Carter's ratification premium became clear as he searched for a senate endorser. Two potential hawkish endorsers, Jackson and Senate minority leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), were wooed unsuccessfully. To placate Jackson, the administration had allowed his protégé, Lt. General Edward Rowny, to be the jcs representative on the salt ii delegation. But Rowny resigned on the eve of the treaty-signing summit, 63 and Jackson compared salt ii to appeasement at Munich. 64 With Jackson lost, the administration looked to Baker, who had been helpful in the Panama Canal ratification. But Baker had his own presidential ambitions. A May 1979 memo by Frank Moore and Bob Beckel from the White House congressional liaison office noted that Baker had "his eyes . . . firmly on 1980," and predicted that he would seek "a way to support salt but make the Administration pay a huge and well-publicized price for his support." 65 Despite this hope, Baker came out against the treaty on June 27.
66
After these defeats, Nunn emerged as an alternative endorser.
67
Though dw-nominate places him a bit to the left of the pivotal senator (see Figure 2) , Nunn was a knowledgeable and credible voice on military affairs. In a January 1979 memo, Moore and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski noted that Nunn was not only "perceived to be an arms control expert, but his conservative credentials give him a great deal of credibility on the political side of the issue. He may be one of the only Senators who can effectively counter Jackson." As a result, they hoped Nunn would ultimately agree to "take on a leadership role for salt ratification." 68 In their detailed Senate analysis of May 1979, Moore and Beckel repeatedly noted that other senators would follow Nunn's cue, but "the question is whether we can satisfy his defense concerns." 69 Indeed, Senator Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.) told a reporter: "salt is incredibly complicated. It hurts your head. Most senators . . . don't have time to be an expert on everything, so you look around for somebody you can trust." 70 But Nunn's support came with a price. Although he had specific treaty concerns, including about verification, his main priority was the overall defense program, which he felt Carter had neglected. 71 As hearings began, Nunn announced that he was willing to support the treaty but only in return for substantial increases in the defense budget. 72 He and two colleagues followed up with a letter to Carter on August 2nd asking for "real increases of at least 4 to 5 percent," more than the 3 percent Carter had requested. 73 Carter later acknowledged that Nunn had used his position as bargaining leverage: "Sam used the salt ii Treaty in a legitimate fashion to extract from me promises for a higher level of defense expenditures, and I didn't particularly object to that."
74
Even if Carter did not object to the strategy, he did object to the demand. Carter publicly resisted Nunn's budget increase on July 27th, 75 and throughout the fall Carter (unlike Nixon) was clearly dissatisfied with the prospect of spending more than even the Pentagon had requested. 76 Increasing the defense budget also risked alienating the left.
77
Three senators wrote to Carter urging him not to violate the spirit of salt by increasing arms not covered by the treaty. 78 The administration was also well aware of the political risks of appearing to buy ratification, particularly at a time of high inflation.
79
Nonetheless, Nunn had opened a channel, and one conservative treaty opponent in the Senate told the Washington Post, "I smell ratification."
80 In early October, Carter conceded a partial increase and finally announced an increase of around 4 percent on December 12, 1979.
81
Nunn was not completely satisfied and joined eighteen other senators (including five Democrats) to write another letter to Carter on December 17, 1979, noting "the ongoing slippage in America's comparative military position" vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
82 Indeed, the debate reflected concerns about Soviet military capabilities and intentions, as well as about the likelihood that it would cheat on the treaty-in other words, it reflected uncertainty about whether the proposed cuts were safe, given the state of the world. During the salt negotiations and 72 Kaiser 1979a. 73 Facts on File World News Digest 1979. 74 Carter interview by Dan Caldwell; see Caldwell 1991 , 138. 75 Carter 1979a See, for example, McIntyre and Moore to Carter, "Meeting with Senate Leaders," September 12, 1979, NLC-126-18-10-1-0, JCL; Wilson and Pincus 1979 . 77 Kaiser 1979b. 78 McGovern, Hatfield, and Proxmire to Carter, March 2, 1979, NLC-133-230-2-11-4, JCL. 79 See Memorandum for Vice President Mondale, "SALT and the Defense Budget," September 6, 1979, NLC-133-103-2-4-3, JCL, 2. 80 Kaiser 1979b . 81 Carter 1979b. 82 Letter from Nineteen Senators to President Carter, December 17, 1979 , Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969 -1976 , XXXIII, SALT II, 1972 -1980 . At https://history.state.gov/his toricaldocuments/frus1969-76v33/d244, accessed debate, many conservatives, as well as Brzezinski, argued for a policy of linkage, so that the United States would not pursue the salt agreement unless the Soviets ceased interventionist behavior that challenged US interests.
83
Although ratification still appeared within reach, the treaty ultimately fell victim to rapidly deteriorating perceptions of the state of the world. For example, in August 1979, an internal US government debate about whether a Soviet brigade in Cuba left over from the days of the Cuban Missile Crisis was intended for combat, broke into public view. As Dan Caldwell notes, the episode blunted salt's momentum, increased attention to verification issues in light of a perceived intelligence failure, decreased confidence in the Carter administration, and delayed the Senate hearings. 84 Debate nevertheless continued and the Foreign Relations Committee voted the treaty out of committee, 9-6, in November 1979. More damaging was a December 1979 report from the Senate Armed Services Committee, penned by Jackson, which condemned the treaty, although Nunn voted against release of the report and was said to be leaning toward ratification. 85 The larger point is that treaty ratification was still plausible after the brigade incident and even as the Iranian hostage crisis unfolded at the beginning of November. Finally, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979, the administration capitulated and withdrew the treaty. 86 Caldwell concludes that if the Senate had voted in "middle to late August, the treaty would have been ratified."
87 Events progressively undermined beliefs about whether the proposed cuts were safe, increasing the ratification premium until it became too high.
The comparison between salt i and salt ii is instructive. Unlike Nixon, Carter could not count on hawks in his own party, making an endorsement crucial. In contrast to Nixon's experience with salt i, the deal Nunn demanded went beyond what the jcs wanted. Thus, while Nixon's side payments largely targeted potential skeptics within the executive branch, Carter faced an additional round of demands. That he nevertheless came close to succeeding-until events meant that Carter could no longer convince the hawks that the treaty would be safe, even with side payments-shows how even dovish presidents, at the right price, can push treaties across the ratification line. 83 Caldwell 1991, 116-17; Lebovic 2013 , 110-15. 84 Caldwell 1991 , 166-68, also 155-69. 85 Caldwell 1991 Yarhi-Milo 2014, 153 , argues that only after the invasion of Afghanistan did Carter's views of Soviet intentions change. 87 Caldwell 1991, 147. Bush, oBama, and arms control after the cold war Bush and sort In the post-Cold War era, sort (or the Moscow Treaty), signed by President Bush in 2001, and New start, signed by President Obama in 2010, provide a comparison of agreements that were similar in their terms and yet faced very different roads to ratification. sort sailed unanimously through the Senate, while New start narrowly cleared the ratification hurdle, 71-24, and then only after President Obama committed to a very costly modernization of the nuclear force. sort was the product of only five months of negotiations that began in January 2002. The agreement called for the reduction of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 within a decade. In ratification debates, opponents like Senator John Kerry, D-Mass., raised concerns about the treaty being "as flimsy a treaty as the United States Senate has ever considered."
88 The "gaping hole," according to Kerry, was the verification regime, which relied on what was seen as an anachronistic carryover from the earlier start i verification processes.
89
Even so, the politics of ratification were straightforward. In 2002, in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan and with the case for war in Iraq brewing, the president was widely regarded as a hawk. Relations with Russia were good, raising few doubts that the proposed cuts were safe. The Joint Chiefs quickly registered their support, with the chairman, General Richard Myers, arguing "the treaty provides for the longterm security interests of our Nation." 90 The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John Warner (R-Va.), cited these military chiefs and concluded that "the Moscow Treaty is the right agreement at the right time." 91 Although Democrats controlled the Senate, arms control doves preferred this modest treaty to no treaty at all. Allaying the skeptics' criticisms required little more than hand-waving. First, the Bush administration responded to verification concerns by arguing that the 1991 start i's inspections and data exchanges would be sufficient and that warming relations between the US and Russia gave reason for confidence. 92 Second, the administration argued that no strategic arms 88 97 Not only did New start replace the Moscow treaty, due to expire in December 2012, it was also less ambitious than its predecessor in several respects. Even though the headline limit on deployed strategic warheads was lower under New start than under sort-1,550 versus 1,700-2,200-by some counts, sort cuts were deeper because New start counted each bomber as only one warhead, despite the fact that bombers carry multiple warheads. 98 Like sort, New start did not require that either side eliminate the weapons. One of the main differences was that sort relied on the inspections regime already ratified under start i; since that regime had expired in December 2009, New start contained a newly negotiated regime that invited more legislative scrutiny. Otherwise, New start was similar enough to sort that, on the basis of their terms alone, the path to ratification should have been equally smooth. negotiating hand. 100 Other concerns were that the treaty did not address tactical nuclear weapons, on which Russia had a 10-to-1 advantage;
101 that it might limit missile defense; 102 and that it would limit the flexibility of American strategic forces. 103 To some extent, changes in US-Russia relations, including the 2008 invasion of Georgia, had raised new doubts about whether the state of the world still justified a deal. And there were ongoing debates about whether Obama's reset with Russia would bear fruit. These uncertainties interacted with perceptions of the president's dovishness. As Michael McFaul, who served on the National Security Council in this period, explained, had Bush been in the White House, he could rely on an argument of "trust us" with legislators, but legislators "did not trust that Obama had made the best, smartest deal he could."
104 Echoing this view, Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) articulated Obama's credibility gap in the following terms: "I do believe when you have a fundamental philosophy that we should go to zero nuclear weapons in the world, you are-you are not going to be the kind of effective negotiators you should be in these kind of tense situations." 105 Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), the Senate minority whip, concluded that Obama's eagerness to get a deal meant, "they [the Russians] get everything out of it. I don't know what we get out of it except for the president to say he made another arms control deal with Russia."
106 Given partisan polarization and impending midterm elections, Republican opponents had political motivation to deny Obama a victory. 107 As noted, this kind of partisan bias is effectively indistinguishable from genuine opposition based on foreign policy preferences.
Like Carter, Obama sought to deal with a key Senate endorser. The main player initially was Kyl, who had a long track record opposing arms control treaties and with whom administration officials virtually established a hotline for lobbying his support, 108 with at least thirty exchanges between August 2009 and November 2010.
109 Republicans also viewed him as "the make-or-break voice on the pact . . . essentially deputizing him" to cut a ratification deal. 110 As Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.) said in reference to Kyl, "[H]e's made it a passion of his, so when he talks, we listen."
111
To address skeptics' concerns, the administration first engaged in a series of "trades" or "package terms."
112 Obama anticipated Kyl's interest in nuclear modernization by promising $80 billion in modernization funds upon submitting New start to the Senate for ratification in May 2010. While acknowledging that modernization was needed, Obama pointed to these funds as going beyond his preferred commitments. 113 The ratification premium increased further when Republicans made large gains in the 2010 midterms. By mid-November, Obama announced that an additional $4.1 billion would go toward modernization, bringing the total to $85 billion over the following decade. 114 In addition, Obama sent a letter to the Senate asserting that the treaty would not place limitations on missile defense and that "we are proceeding apace with a missile defense system in Europe."
115
In the end, Kyl withdrew his support in November 2010, and Obama scrambled to find alternative endorsers. Keeping the package of side payments intact, he found one in Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), who, like Kyl, was to the right of the pivotal legislator (see Figure 2) . Administration officials also worked to locate prominent endorsers outside of the Senate. 116 The most valuable were high-level Republican officials who had established strong arms control credentials, including former Secretary of State James Baker and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, although secretaries of state who had served the previous five Republican presidents also published an op-ed endorsing the treaty in early December. 117 The administration also enlisted the public support of General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the jcs. the New York Times noted, "no other Russian-American arms control treaty that was ultimately ratified ever generated as much opposition on the final vote." 120 Obama took criticism on the left for failing to deliver on disarmament.
121 An alternative reading is that a Democrat with disarmament goals was able to push through an arms control treaty-albeit at a price.
conclusion
We have argued that doves pay a ratification premium to secure domestic approval of arms control deals. This premium makes acting according to type politically viable, if challenging. Our argument also suggests that after accounting for the effect of side payments, the policy gap between hawks and doves is likely to be smaller than ideology suggests. The argument is an important corrective to the usual Nixon-to-China logic, at least in the context of nuclear security. Leaders, that is, are not captives of their types 122 but have strategies to overcome constraints imposed by other actors and institutions.
Although scholars have invoked a similar logic in other, nonsecurity contexts, several features of the arms control setting shape our argument and affect generalizability. Among the factors that limit generalizability, first, although arms control may have some limited distributional consequences, few interest groups directly engage the issue and those that do tend to be ideological. As Milner and Dustin Tingley argue, the distributional nature of some issues, like trade, mobilizes interest groups to lobby and inform Congress, increasing the number of actors who would require side payments while also reducing the president's information advantage.
123 Second, the types of side payments available for an arms control agreement are also limited, since nondefense items may create the appearance of playing politics with nuclear security. Promising military or even nuclear programs can be sold as prudent defense posture management. Among the factors that favor generalizability, nuclear security shares with climate change and trade a technocratic flavor and so the logic involving delegation to an endorser who is effectively empowered to negotiate for a bloc might be more broadly relevant. Given its theoretical plausibility in other issue areas and the leverage our logic offers in nuclear security, we suggest that subsequent research explores the conditions under which it is possible for politicians to "go to China," including when they must pay a premium to do so. Finally, our model also offers an explanation for a puzzle suggested by the literature on playing against type. Given incentives to do so, we would expect voters to shift their perceptions at some point to align with what the parties actually do, leading to the breakdown of party brands like Democratic dovishness. In our model, if transfers take the form of unregulated military effort, then a true dove's total military effort can be higher than that of the moderate dove, even if the headline level of cuts in the dove's treaty are deeper. For their part, voters are more likely to be aware of the treaty itself than of the side payments made to ensure ratification. If the salient headline is the fact of an arms control treaty, the image of a dove cutting arms is likely to stick, even if the dove is delivering relatively hawkish outcomes overall. Our model shows that polarization has effectively increased the range of presidents who would behave like doves and also increased the distance such presidents have to cover with side payments to secure agreements. Ironically, then, the image of a dovish Democrat may be reinforced at the same time as Democratic presidents make larger military investments to obtain ratification. 
